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Abstract 
This dissertation contains three empirical research projects investigating the 
relationship between corporate governance and the performance of mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) at the domestic and international levels. Each of the three stand-alone chapters 
provides a different perspective on corporate governance and its effects on risk management 
and shareholder wealth in M&A transactions. Within this context, this thesis makes a 
substantial original contribution to advancing the existing knowledge on measuring, 
documenting and determining the effects of corporate governance on M&A corporate 
investment decisions.  
The first project in Chapter 2 focuses on the role of corporate governance in improving 
corporate credit risk in cross-border M&As. Using a large global sample, this chapter finds that 
an ???????????????????????is reduced after buying target companies from countries with stronger 
creditor or shareholder protection. This result supports the hypothesis that firms can improve 
governance quality by investing in countries with better regulatory standards. However, 
corporate credit risk does not deteriorate for acquirers when the takeover target resides in a 
country with weaker regulatory governance, as managerial behaviour is still constrained by the 
stricter home regulatory environment. The asymmetric effect of corporate governance on credit 
risk is robust to the asset quality of the target firm and is more pronounced when it involves a 
publicly listed target company. The findings of this chapter shed light on a governance arbitrage 
strategy through which acquirers could manage credit risk in cross-border M&As. 
Chapter 3 contributes to the ongoing debate about the effects of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), another dimension of ???????????????????????????????????????????????It 
reveals that the market have different reactions to a ???????socially responsible and irresponsible 
CSR behaviours. There is no evidence that the stock market rewards socially responsible 
acquirers in the short term. However, this chapter does find strong evidence that the market 
judges investments by socially irresponsible firms more negatively. The findings are more 
pronounced for those acquirers who engage in more CSR activities involving the community, 
employment relations, environmental and human rights issues. These results suggest that, while 
??
?
firms cannot create shareholder wealth by merely investing in more socially responsible 
activities, they can achieve this goal by minimising socially irresponsible behaviours. 
Chapter 4 further studies the effects of ???????????????????????????????????????????? on 
M&A performance. This chapter finds that acquirers identified as ????? firms (i.e. firms have 
business involved with tobacco, firearms, alcohol, nuclear power, military and gambling) have 
significantly higher M&As announcement abnormal stock returns. This result supports the 
hypothesis that the elevated scrutiny and litigation risk faced by sin acquirers will force 
managers to produce high-quality M&A decisions, which is consequently reflected in 
shareholder returns. High-quality financial reporting released by sin companies also reduces 
???????????? ??????????? ?????????? ?????????????? ???????? ??? ???????? ????gerial investment 
activities and enhancing M&A efficiency. This chapter also reveals that sin acquirers are more 
likely to substitute stock with cash as the method of M&A payment, as the shares of firms with 
a controversial business are not well accepted as the currency. It also takes longer for sin 
acquirers to complete M&A deals, due to the social norm conflicts and difficulties in the post-
deal integration. This chapter also provides firm-level evidence about sin stock neglect-effects. 
 
 
  
???
?
Acknowledgements 
It would has been impossible to complete this thesis without the invaluable support and 
instructions from my supervisors. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Professor 
Dave Michayluk and Associate Professor Marco Navone for their supervision, motivation and 
inspiration, and their continuous support and insightful comments throughout my Ph.D. 
candidature. I am immensely grateful for their infinite patience and instruction during these 
years to help me solve numerous questions and doubts on research. I am also greatly indebted 
to Associate Professor Eliza Wu for opening the gate for me to explore the academic world and 
for her guidance, encouragement, extensive help, insightful knowledge, and life advice. I am 
also very grateful to Dr. Nahid Rahman for providing extensive help for my research 
foundation building, contributing comments, and providing continuous support and instruction. 
The skills, knowledge and positive attitude that I have developed under their supervision will 
continue to be a motivation for my future professional career.  
I am thankful for the support of staff members from the UTS Finance Discipline Group. 
I especially wish to thank Dr. Christina Nikitopoulos for coordinating the Ph.D. program and 
providing substantial assistance and benefit to Ph.D. students. I would also like to acknowledge 
Dr. Lucy Zhao, who has been a great mentor to me. I am greatly appreciative of the support 
from Andrea Greer, Mala Kapahi and Stephanie Ough. I would also like to appreciate Dr. Vinay 
Patel, Dr. Vitali Alexeev, Dr. Nadima El-Hassan, Dr. Danny Yeung, Dr. Lei Shi and Associate 
Professor Song Shi for helping me with casual academic jobs. The feedback from participants 
in my progress and stage presentations are much appreciated. To all my fellow Ph.D. students, 
it has been a pleasure to share all these years with you, and I especially appreciated the 
inspiration from Nihad Aliyev, Thomas To and Christina Bui.  
In addition, I am grateful for the financial support from the Business School and the 
Graduate School of the University of Technology Sydney. Without their scholarships and 
funding, it would not be possible to complete this thesis and to attend the worthwhile 
international conference and benefit from the feedback received from conference participants. 
I would also like to express my thankfulness to Mr Adrian Stokes for proofreading my writing. 
????
?
Lastly but most importantly, I am eternally grateful to my beloved wife Claire for 
accompanying me during the Ph.D. journey. It would have been impossible to pursue my 
doctoral studies without her understanding, optimistic encouragement, continuous support and 
dedication to family. To my family, I am immensely appreciative for the unconditional support, 
belief, encouragement and endless love from my parents and parents-in-law. Without their 
support, I would have certainly crumbled under the arduous task of completing this work, and 
it is to them that I dedicate my dissertation. Personally, it has been a rewarding and enriching 
journey and I look forward to my post-Ph.D. life. 
 
  
?????
?
Table of Contents 
Chapter 1: Introduction .......................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Motivation and Objective ......................................................................................... 2 
1.2 Literature Review ..................................................................................................... 3 
1.2.1 Mergers and Acquisitions .............................................................................. 3 
1.2.2 M&As and Risk Management ........................................................................ 5 
1.2.3 M&As and Shareholder Wealth ..................................................................... 6 
1.3 Thesis Overview and Contributions to the Literature .............................................. 7 
1.4 Thesis Outline ......................................................................................................... 12 
Chapter 2: The Value of Corporate Governance on Credit Risk: Evidence from Cross-
border M&As ......................................................................................................................... 13 
2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 14 
2.2 Data and Sample Construction ............................................................................... 20 
2.3 Variable Construction ............................................................................................. 25 
2.3.1 Credit Risk Change ...................................................................................... 25 
2.3.2 Corporate Governance Quality ................................................................... 26 
2.3.3 Control Variables ......................................................................................... 27 
2.4 Governance Quality and Credit Risk ...................................................................... 31 
2.4.1 Corporate Governance Difference and Variation ........................................ 32 
2.4.2 Geographical and Cultural Distance........................................................... 37 
2.5 Governance Quality or Asset Quality ..................................................................... 42 
2.5.1 Public vs Private Target ............................................................................... 42 
2.5.2 Relative Size Tests ........................................................................................ 45 
2.6 Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 47 
Chapter 3: ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Wealth: New Evidence from Mergers .................................................................................. 52 
3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 53 
3.2 Research Question and Hypotheses ....................................................................... 59 
3.3 Data Construction and Summary Statistics ............................................................ 60 
???
?
3.4 Key variables Construction and Empirical Framework ......................................... 62 
3.4.1 Measuring CSR Strength and Concern ........................................................ 62 
3.4.2 Abnormal Stock Performance ...................................................................... 65 
3.4.3 Empirical Framework .................................................................................. 66 
3.5 Empirical Results ................................................................................................... 67 
3.5.1 Univariate Results ........................................................................................ 67 
3.5.2 Cross-sectional Regression Analysis ........................................................... 68 
3.6 Robustness Checks and Sensitivity Tests ............................................................... 75 
3.6.1 Alternative Model Specifications ................................................................. 75 
3.6.2 Endogeneity Tests ......................................................................................... 78 
3.6.3 Additional CSR Controversial Business Issues Controls ............................. 80 
3.6.4 Other Sensitivity Tests .................................................................................. 83 
3.7 Summary and Conclusion ...................................................................................... 85 
Chapter 4: The Value of Controversial Social Norms on Mergers and Acquisitions ...... 93 
4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 94 
4.2 Research Questions and Testable Hypotheses ........................................................ 98 
4.2.1 The Valuation and Return Effects of Sin Stocks at Firm Level .................... 98 
4.2.2 The M&A Announcement Returns of Sin Acquirers ..................................... 99 
4.3 Identification of Sin .............................................................................................. 100 
4.4 Data Construction and Summary Statistics .......................................................... 105 
4.4.1 Sample of Valuation Regressions ............................................................... 105 
4.4.2 Sample of Cross-sectional Return Regressions .......................................... 105 
4.4.3 Sample of M&A Regressions ...................................................................... 105 
4.5 Key Variables Construction .................................................................................. 108 
4.5.1 Measuring the Controversial Business Ratings ......................................... 108 
4.5.2 Abnormal Stock Performance .................................................................... 111 
4.6 Empirical Results ................................................................................................. 111 
4.6.1 Firm-level Sin Valuation Effects ................................................................ 111 
4.6.2 Firm-level Cross-sectional Returns ........................................................... 116 
4.6.3 Sin Acquirer M&A Returns ........................................................................ 119 
??
?
4.6.4 M&A Payment Preference ......................................................................... 127 
4.6.5 M&A Completion Duration ....................................................................... 129 
4.7 Robustness Checks and Sensitivity Tests ............................................................. 132 
4.8 Summary and Conclusion .................................................................................... 133 
Chapter 5: Conclusions and Future Research................................................................... 137 
5.1 Concluding Remarks for This Thesis ................................................................... 138 
5.2 Directions for Further Research Work.................................................................. 140 
References ............................................................................................................................. 142 
?
  
???
?
List of Tables and Figures 
Table 2. 1: Sample Distribution by Deals Announcement Year and Countries ...................... 22 
Table 2. 2: Sample Distribution by Acquirer and Target Countries ....................................... 23 
Table 2. 3: Summary Statistics for Chapter 2 ......................................................................... 30 
Table 2. 4: Corporate Governance Quality and Credit Risk ................................................... 33 
Table 2. 5: Asymmetric Effect of Corporate Governance Quality ......................................... 34 
Table 2. 6: Difference in Governance Quality and Distance between Countries ................... 39 
Table 2. 7: Residual Difference in Governance Quality and Credit Risk .............................. 40 
Table 2. 8: Public and Private Targets .................................................................................... 44 
Table 2. 9: Large and Small Merger and Acquisition Deals ................................................... 46 
Table 3. 1: Sample Distribution by Year and Industry ........................................................... 61 
Table 3. 2: Summary Statistics for Chapter 3 ......................................................................... 64 
Table 3. 3: Univariate Tests .................................................................................................... 69 
Table 3. 4: The Positive Association between Aggregate CSR and Merger Returns ............. 70 
Table 3. 5: Cumulative Abnormal Returns against CSR Strengths and Concerns ................. 73 
Table 3. 6: Regression Results for CSR Individual Dimensions ............................................ 76 
Table 3. 7: CSR Strength and CSR Concern Rating Separately............................................. 77 
Table 3. 8: Robustness to Endogeneity................................................................................... 79 
Table 3. 9: Robustness Test with Additional CSR Controversial Controls ............................ 81 
Table 3. 10: Additional Target CSR Controls ......................................................................... 84 
Table 4. 1: KLD Controversial Business Issues ................................................................... 102 
Table 4. 2: ????????????????????????????????? ....................................................................... 104 
Table 4. 3: ???? ??????????????????? ???????????? ???????????????? .................................... 107 
Table 4. 4: Summary Statistics for Chapter 4 ....................................................................... 110 
Table 4. 5: Firm-level Evidence of Sin Stocks Valuation Effects ........................................ 114 
Table 4. 6: Firm-level Evidence of Sin Stocks Expected Returns ........................................ 118 
Table 4. 7: ???? ????????????????????? ??????????????????? ??? ................................... 122 
Table 4. 8: ???? ??????????????and Vote Interaction .......................................................... 125 
Table 4. 9: ???? ????????????????????????????????? ........................................................... 128 
????
?
Table 4. 10: Completion Time of M&A Deals for Sin Acquirers ......................................... 130 
Table 4. 11: Firm-level Valuation Effects for Sin Acquirers?M&A Sample ........................ 131 
Table 4. 12: Firm-level Expected Returns for Sin Acquirers?M&A Sample ....................... 132 
????????????? ????????????????????????????????????? ............................................................ 15 
Figure 3. 1: CSR Marginal Effects ......................................................................................... 72 
 
Appendices 
Appendix A. 1: Variable Definitions and Data Sources for Chapter 2 ................................... 49 
Appendix A. 2: Hofstede?? (1980, 2001) Culture Dimension ................................................ 51 
Appendix B. 1: Variable Definitions and Data Sources for Chapter 3 ................................... 87 
Appendix B. 2: KLD Strength and Concern Indicators ......................................................... 90 
Appendix B. 3: Variable Correlation Matrix .......................................................................... 92 
Appendix C.??? ???????? ??????????????? ???????????????? ???????????????????? 
 
?
 
